Values, names, descriptions, tags, profiles, policy and audit entries are sealed on the device. spec §3.2, §7
Random IDs, revisions, sizes, timestamps, device public keys, roles and request metadata.
ak-vault is the opt-in, end-to-end encrypted sync layer for AgentKit's ak secrets. Secrets are sealed on your device before they leave it, agents keep reading from the local vault, and with sync off nothing touches the network. A browser dashboard and remote MCP are on in production by owner decision on 2026-11-01, before their release gate passed; they are pre-release and not for production credentials; remote MCP passes plaintext through server memory during a call (details).
A key starts in one .env file. Then it is pasted into a chat for a teammate, lands in shell history, gets copied to a second laptop and ends up in an agent's config. Every copy is plaintext that someone else can read.
configs say ${secret:OPENAI_API_KEY}
Values live in the OS keychain or the age-encrypted file vault. Agents receive a value only through a grant you approved, and every release is recorded in a local audit ledger.
That fixes one machine. ak-vault adds the missing piece: the same vault on your other devices, without handing the values to a server.
Your local vault stays the source of truth. Sync is an optional path between devices you enrolled yourself.
ak secrets set stores it in the OS keychain or the age-encrypted file vault, as it does today. Nothing leaves the machine unless you turn sync on.
Name, value and description are encrypted together under a per-item key derived from the vault key. The device signs the record with its own key.
It checks the device's token and proof, accepts the write only if the revision matches, and keeps conflicts and deletions. It holds no key that opens the record.
Device B checks the signature, the owner-signed member list and its last witnessed checkpoint. It refuses anything older, then decrypts into its own local vault.
resolve always come from the local vault. Read the full walkthrough: keys, enrollment and conflicts.The server needs a little metadata to order and authorize writes. Everything that describes a secret travels inside the ciphertext.
name OPENAI_API_KEY value sk-proj-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx meta "Billing project key" sensitivity high
{"item_id":"q7N2fXk0RZ1hTqLw9bYc4A", "base_revision":7, "key_epoch":1, "env":{"alg":"xc20p", "n":"u3Rk9QeZ2vP0aL8m…", "ct":"Hq9Zx2LmVb0Rk7TnYc4W…"}, "sig":"Zk3pW8…"}
ct. The Worker sees metadata such as a random ID, revisions and a signature, and holds no key that opens them.| Data | On your device | What the server stores |
|---|---|---|
| Secret name | OPENAI_API_KEY | encryptedinside ctItem IDs are random and never derived from names. |
| Secret value | sk-proj-… | encryptedinside ctNever in logs, errors or telemetry. |
| Description, tags, profile, sensitivity | "Billing project key", high | encryptedinside ct |
| Vault key | Unwrapped in memory when needed | wrappedonly to your devices, your password-derived key and your recovery key |
| Item ID and revision | You use the name instead | q7N2fXk0…, revision 8Needed to order writes and catch conflicts. |
| Sizes and timestamps | Same | Shows roughly how many items change, and when. Sizes hint at value length. |
| Devices and members | Your device list | device IDs, public keys, roles, accountsThe signed member list, so the server can authorize requests. |
| Network metadata | Not applicable | IP address and request timing at the edge |
| Master password, recovery key, device private keys | Only here | never sent |
These are design properties of protocol v1 as proposed. They hold only after the implementation passes every security gate in issue #8. The owner accepted the review gate on 2026-10-16 with no written findings; no independent third party has reviewed it.
Values, names, descriptions, tags, profiles, policy and audit entries are sealed on the device. spec §3.2, §7
Random IDs, revisions, sizes, timestamps, device public keys, roles and request metadata.
A hash-chained, owner-signed log decides which devices receive the vault key. Injected recipients are rejected. spec §4
Anyone holding a vault's key can decrypt every item in it. There is no per-secret access; use separate vaults instead.
Devices keep signed checkpoints and refuse server state older than one they already witnessed. spec §6
A malicious server can hide updates that a new or long-offline device has never seen. Detecting that needs a second channel, such as another device's checkpoint.
Device-bound tokens plus a per-request device signature. Revoked devices and sessions are refused on every request, and lookup errors fail closed. spec §9
Revocation blocks new keys and ciphertext. Anything a device already decrypted stays exposed, so affected secrets are marked to rotate.
resolve reads the local vault and never waits on the Worker. With sync off, secrets make zero network requests.
ak secrets run (planned) hands the value to the process you approved. The vault controls and records the release; it cannot take the value back from that program.
Writes use revision compare-and-swap. A stale write gets 409 and is kept as a conflict branch for you to resolve, and deleted stays deleted. spec §5
Protocol v1 is a proposal; the owner accepted the review gate with no written findings. Treat every property on this page as a design target until every release gate is met.
The encrypted recovery bundle carries the owner's public trust anchor, the recovery signing key and the newest witnessed checkpoint, so a fresh device does not take the server's word. spec §3.4
Without an enrolled device, your master password or your recovery key, nobody can decrypt the vault, including AgentKit.
Read the full security model, with each adversary, its defence and the risk that stays with you.
The local vault ships in the AgentKit CLI now. Sync commands are a hidden, unsupported preview in the released CLI; agent-discovery commands are planned and not available yet.
.envMove existing values into the vault in one pass. Delete the plaintext file once you have checked the import.
$ ak secrets import-env .env
$ ak secrets list
Agent configs carry a reference. The value is resolved locally, for an agent you granted it to.
OPENAI_API_KEY=${secret:OPENAI_API_KEY}
Opt in, then enroll another device by comparing a six-digit code on both screens. Syntax may change.
# PREVIEW: hidden in the released CLI, unsupported, syntax may change
$ ak secrets sync enable
Work is tracked in the epic, issue #1. Personal-vault sync comes first. No dates are promised.
Ships in the AgentKit CLI: keychain or age-encrypted file vault, agent grants, approvals and an audit ledger.
Spec, TypeScript reference and a Go implementation that reproduce every vector. #2
Cloudflare Worker with a SQLite Durable Object per vault, including shared-vault membership. The production sync API is live as a pre-release preview, before the review. #4, #5
The sync commands ship hidden in the released ak beta; the removal-fence client is included since v3.0.0-beta.31.
Red team, a two-device end-to-end run with real clients, rollback rehearsal and a review by the owner (not independent). #8
After personal sync: read-only CI identities (#6) and portable policy with encrypted audit (#7).
Cloud Sync is a pre-release preview and free for AgentKit users while we use it ourselves. It is not yet recommended for production credentials. Paid annual plans start only after general availability, and preview users are told before any billing begins. Progress toward GA: #237.
| Plan | Price | Vaults | Devices per vault | Storage per vault |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Preview (now) | Free with an AgentKit sign-in | 3 | 5 | 10 MB |
| AgentKit customers, after GA | $9 / year with a valid AgentKit license | 5 | 5 | 25 MB |
| Everyone else, after GA | $19 / year | 5 | 5 | 25 MB |
| Self-hosted | Free, open source (MIT); in progress | Your choice | Your choice | Your choice |
Every plan is end-to-end encrypted: by design, the server stores ciphertext only. Limits are planned and not yet enforced; fair use applies. If a plan lapses, your vaults turn read-only and are never deleted. No lock-in: ak-vault is open source, and you will be able to deploy it to your own Cloudflare account and point ak secrets at it (in progress, #236).
Only as a preview. Protocol v1 is proposed; its review gate was accepted by the owner, not by an independent third party (#8). By owner decision the production sync API went live before that review as a pre-release preview: if you are signed in and run the preview ak secrets sync commands, your device syncs with it. It is not yet recommended for production credentials. The local ak secrets vault works today.
The design says no: the server stores ciphertext and wrapped keys only, and never receives your master password, recovery key or device private keys. It can see the metadata listed under two views of one secret. Treat this as a design claim: the owner accepted the review gate with no written findings, no independent third party has reviewed it, and the release gates are not all met. Remote MCP (pre-release, not for production credentials) narrows this: during a call, plaintext passes through the server's memory, though it is never stored or logged (remote access).
Nothing changes for running agents. resolve reads the local vault and never waits on the network. Changes made while offline sync on the next successful connection, and conflicting edits are kept for you to resolve.
Not within one vault. A vault key decrypts every item in the vault, so v1 makes no per-secret access claim. Put the secrets you want to share in a separate shared vault.
Revoke the device. Revocation is checked on every request, so a revoked device or session is refused new reads and writes. Anything it already decrypted cannot be clawed back, so rotate sensitive credentials at the provider.
See all questions, grouped by status, security, everyday use, teams and recovery. What is live, preview and gated, surface by surface: status.
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